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Reingen: The Current Role of the Presumption of Innocence in the Criminal

NOTE
THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
I.

INTRODUCTION

The presumption of innocence has traditionally been considered a fundamental principle of the criminal justice system in
this country. Two major areas of dispute, however, have been
discernible: whether the principle is merely a shorthand method
of explaining the burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard, and whether the doctrine is applicable outside the trial
stage. Recent United States Supreme Court opinions have tried
in three different contexts to resolve these issues regarding the
presumption of innocence.
The first context involves the use of the presumption of innocence in jury instructions. In Kentucky v. Whorton,I the Court
held that the Constitution does not require a judge to instruct the
jury about the presumption of innocence in every case in which
the instruction is requested. 2 The Court, in effect, considered the
presumption an additional explanation of the allocation of the
burden of proof that, if otherwise expressed to the jury, negates
the necessity of instructing the jury specifically on the presumption of innocence.
The second context in which questions about the presumption have arisen is the practice of compelling a defendant to wear
his prison clothes at trial. In Estelle v. Williams,3 the Court held
that compelling a defendant to wear his prison clothes during his
trial was constitutionally impermissible' because the practice
impaired the presumption of innocence, 5 which the Court considered a basic component of a fair trial.' The standard designated
by the Court for waiver of this right, however, was a weaker
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

99 S. Ct. 2088 (1979).
Id. at 2090.
425 U.S. 501, rehearing denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976).
425 U.S. at 512.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 503.
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standard than that ordinarily used for waiver of a constitutional
right.' Thus, although the Court found the presumption of innocence applicable to this situation, the Court's treatment of the
waiver issue greatly diminished the benefit of its holding to criminal defendants.
The third context is the applicability of the presumption of
innocence outside the trial stage. Many lower courts have used
the presumption of innocence as a means to strike down harsh
conditions of pretrial detention.8 In Bell v. Wolfish,9 however, the
Court stated that the presumption of innocence is nothing more
than a rule of evidence at trial, even though the Court itself had
previously applied the presumption of innocence to situations
outside the courtroom."0 The Court said that the principle has no
applicability when determining the rights of a detainee" during
pretrial confinement.' 2
These three cases have completely eliminated application of
the presumption outside the courtroom and, in the courtroom,
have reduced its importance to an extent that it now provides
little if any protection for the criminal defendant. These limitations on application of the principle may be avoided, however, if
state courts can be induced to use their own state constitutions
to support the presumption of innocence. An examination of the
history of the presumption of innocence is helpful in evaluating
the issues surrounding the principle.
L.

HISTORY

Greenleaf,'" the nineteenth century commentator, is gener-

ally credited with having traced the doctrine of the presumption
of innocence back to the book of Deuteronomy. 4 The relevant
passage in Deuteronomy, which concerns the crime of idolatry,
states that when one is informed or has learned of the crime, a
thorough inquiry must be made, and if the charge is true, the
7. Id. at 512-13.
8. See text accompanying note 117 infra.
9. 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
10. See text accompanying notes 98-111 infra.
11. A pretrial detainee is one who is detained because he cannot afford bail or because
he is accused of committing a nonbailable offense.
12. 99 S. Ct. at 1871.
13. S. GREEAP, A TReATISE ON THE LAW OF EvmEcE (14th ed. 1883).
14. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895).
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person must be punished. 5 In essence, the verse discusses the
procedure used and the proof necessary to find the accused guilty.
The principle of presumed innocence, basically the same in
Sparta, Athens, and Rome, 6 was part of the explanation of the
allocation of the burden of proof: the accuser had to prove the
accused's guilt. In the early common law of England, the presumption was evident in the belief that in a doubtful case it was
better to release the accused than to risk convicting the innocent. 7 Until the nineteenth century, emphasis in English practice
was placed not on the presumption of innocence but on the rule
that a person must be proved guilty by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.'8
The earliest mention of the presumption of innocence in
American law was in 1657 in Massachusetts:"9 "in a criminal case,
. . .every man is honest and innocent unless it be proved legally
to the contrary."2 From that time until the nineteenth century,
the presumption of innocence received little attention by the
courts.'
In 1895, in Coffin v. United States," the United States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error not to charge the
jury on the presumption of innocence when requested to do so,
even though the judge had instructed the jury fully about reasonable doubt.1 The Court stated that the presumption of innocence
was a concept separate and distinct from the reasonable doubt
standard. Distinguishing the two concepts, the Court said that
the presumption of innocence was one of the instruments of proof,
whereas reasonable doubt was a condition of mind produced by
the proof; one was a cause, the other, the effect. 24 The Court
concluded that the presumption of innocence was substantive
evidence in favor of the accused."
15. Deuteronomy 14:4.
16. 3 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 13, § 29 n.3.
17. Id.
18. J. THAYER, A PRELIMNARY TREAT SE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 555 (1898).
19. Thaler, Punishingthe Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption
of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. Rav. 441, 460.
20. J. THAYER, supra note 18, at 552 (quoting Records of Massachusetts, iii. 434-35
(1657)).
21. J. THAYER, supra note 18, at 554.
22. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
23. Id. at 461.
24. Id. at 460.
25. Id. at 459 (quoting 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 13, § 34).
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Professor Thayer adamantly attacked this conclusion.26 He

believed the presumption of innocence was
merely one form of phrase for what is included in the statement
that an accused person is not to be prejudiced at his trial by
having been charged with crime and held in custody, or by any
mere suspicions. .

.

.[I]t is a convenient and familiar phrase,

and probably a useful one, when carefully explained; but it has
not played any conspicuous part in the development of.our criminal law27

except as a synonym for the reasonable doubt standard. Thayer28
was joined in this belief by two other commentators, Wigmore
and McCormick.2 '
Nevertheless, Thayer conceded that a defendant should have
the right to such a jury instruction." He said that the principle
had assumed a very important additional function, namely, "that
of warning our untrained tribunal, the jury, against being misled
by suspicion, conjecture, and mere appearances."13' Again, Wigmore 2 and McCormicks agreed.

After Thayer's scathing attack on Coffin, the Supreme Court
changed its opinion that the presumption constituted substantive
evidence. In Agnew v. United States,3 the Court heard a chal26. J. THAYER, supra note 18, at 551.
27. Id. at 565-66.
28. "[T]he 'presumption of innocence' is in truth merely another form of expression
for a part of the accepted rule for the burden of proof . . . the rule that it is for the
prosecution to adduce evidence. . . , and to produce persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . ." 9 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENcE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
29. "[I]t consists of nothing more than an amplification of the prosecution's burden
of persuasion." C. McCoRMCK, McCoRMCK oN EvinaNcE § 342 (2d ed. 1972).
30. J. THAYER, supra note 18, at 572.
31. Id. at 559.
32. [T]he term does convey a special and perhaps useful hint, over and above
the other form of the rule about the burden of proof, in that it cautions the jury
to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the
indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the
legal evidence adduced. In other words, . . . the presumption of innocence...
conveys for the jury a special and additional caution . . . to consider, . . .
nothing but the evidence ....
9 J. WIOMORE, supra note 28, § 2511.
33. In the first edition Dean McCormick called the presumption of innocence an
unnecessary amplification of the instructions about the burden of proof and the reasonable
doubt standard. C. MCCORMCK, supra note 29, § 342 n.45. In the second edition, the text
stated that the presumption of innocence, even though misleading in the sense that it
suggests some inherent probability that the defendant is innocent, "should not be discarded." Id. § 342.
34. 165 U.S. 36 (1897).
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lenge to a jury instruction that charged the presumption of innocence, but despite counsel's request, did not mention the principle as substantive evidence. The Court held that the charge was
sufficient as given." Coffin, nevertheless, still stood for the proposition that an instruction on the presumption of innocence must
be given to the jury upon request.
III.

THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
AS A JURY INSTRUCTION

Recent Supreme Court cases have implicitly overruled the
holding in Coffin to the detriment of criminal defendants. In
Taylor v. Kentucky,"' the Court held, on the facts of the case, that
failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of defendant's due process right to a
3
fair trial7.
Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to a term
of five years 3 at a trial in which the victim and defendant were
the only witnesses.3 9 The testimony was no more than a swearing
contest." The victim claimed that defendant and a companion
had forced their way into the victim's home, struck the victim
and then took his house key and billfold, neither of which had
been recovered." Defendant claimed that he had spent the night
in a parked car with two friends watching a rainstorm and a
power failure. 2 The prosecutor implied in both opening and closing arguments that the jury should infer guilt from the arrest, the
indictment, and certain conduct of defendant. 3 Moreover, at the
close of the evidence, the court refused requested jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and the fact that the indictment is not evidence." Furthermore, the court gave only a
very brief statement about the reasonable doubt standard.45 On
the basis of these facts, the Supreme Court reversed defendant's
35. Id. at 51-52.
36. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).

37. Id. at 490.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

481.
480.
488.
480.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 486-87.
44. Id. at 479.
45. Id. at 486.
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conviction, finding that defendant's due process right to a fair
trial had been violated by the court's failure to instruct the jury
on the presumption of innocence.
The language of the opinion, however, clouded the meaning
of the holding. The Court extolled the importance of the presumption of innocence, reiterating from Estelle v. Williams4" that
the principle of presumptive innocence was a basic component of
a fair trial," and quoting Coffin v. United States:4 " 'The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.'""' On the other hand, the Court stated that an
instruction using the specific phrase, the presumption of innocence, may not be constitutionally mandated. 50 It "simply represents one means of protecting the accused's constitutional right
to be judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial."' ' Reverting to its previous stance in strong support of the principle,
the Court indicated that it should not be abandoned 52 because it
provides an additional warning to the jurors to consider only the
evidence presented at trial. The Court cited commentators
Thayer, Wigmore, and McCormick in support.5"
The concurring and dissenting opinions compounded the
confusion concerning the majority opinion. Justice Brennan
wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that because the
presumption of innocence was a basic component of a fair trial,
the instruction should be required in all cases in which it is requested "as is clear from the Court's opinion."5 4 In a dissent

joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens wrote, citing Coffin,
that although it was reversible error to refuse a request for a
proper instruction on the presumption of innocence, this was not
a sufficient reason for holding that the instruction was constitutionally required in every criminal trial.5 Thus, three justices
46. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
47. 436 U.S. at 479 (citing 425 U.S. at 503).
48. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
49. 436 U.S. at 483 (citing 156 U.S. at 453).
50. 436 U.S. at 485.
51. Id. at 486.
52. Id. at 484. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
53. 436 U.S. at 484.
54. Id. at 490-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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believed that the majority opinion held that an instruction on the
presumption of innocence was constitutionally required in every
case, even though the Court had specifically stated that a violation occurred only on the facts of the case.
Confusion over the opinion crystallized in Kentucky v.
Whorton.6 A divided Supreme Court of Kentucky, interpreting
Taylor, held that an instruction on the presumption of innocence
was constitutionally required in all criminal trials in which it is
requested and that the failure to give it is always reversible
error.5 7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the Kentucky Supreme Court's interpretation." In a per
curiam opinion, the Court held that the failure to give an instruction on the presumption of innocence when requested does not in
and of itself constitute a violation of the Constitution. 9 The Court
said that in Taylor the focus was on the failure to give the instruction within the context of the overall fairness of the trial,"0 and
that no intention existed to create a rule that an instruction on
the presumption of innocence was constitutionally required in
every case in which it is requested.81
The Court indicated that the determination of whether a
constitutional violation had occurred must be evaluated on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances, including all the instructions given to the jury, the arguments of counsel, the weight
of the evidence, and other relevant factors.6 2 The Court pointed
out that in Whorton, unlike Taylor, numerous eyewitnesses identified defendant, defendant's car contained incriminating evidence, 3 and defendant did not take the stand, although his wife
and sister were alibi witnesses.64 The Court remanded the case to
the state court 65 to determine whether a violation had occurred.
By using a totality of the circumstances test, instead of a defini56. 99 S. Ct. 2088 (1979).
57. Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Ky. 1978); see Note, Criminal
Procedure-JuryInstructions-Presumptionof Innocence-Denialof Request Requires
Automatic Reversal-Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S. W.2d 627 (Ky. 1978), 6 N. KY.
L. REv. 205, 210 (1979).
58. 99 S. Ct. 832 (1979).
59. 99 S. Ct. at 2090.
60. Id. at 2089.
61. Id. at 2090.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2088.
64. Id. at 2089.
65. Id. at 2090.
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tive rule, the Court dictated an ad hoc approach. As a result, trial
judges and defendants are faced with uncertainty. The circumstances demanding the instruction on the presumption of innocence are undefined, and the decision is left to the discretion of
each trial judge.
In Whorton the Court impliedly accepted that the presumption of innocence simply represents one way of illustrating that
the prosecutor has the burden of proof and must present evidence
at trial of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This function of the presumption dates back to the time of Thayer's attack
on Coffin." Although in Whorton the Court held that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not constitutionally required, in In re Winship 7 the Court had held that the reasonable
doubt standard is constitutionally required. In Winship the Court
held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 6
The reason for such a demanding standard is to reduce the risk
of convictions based on factual error, 9 convictions that would
deprive a criminal defendant of his liberty and permanently stigmatize him."
A second reason that supports this high standard is to com.
mand the respect and confidence of the public in the criminal
justice system. "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."'" Additionally, it is important that every individual be free from concern
that the government might impose criminal sanctions without
convincing the factfinder of guilt to the utmost certainty.7 2 The
Court stated that this reasonable doubt standard embodied the
concrete substance of the presumption of innocence. 3 Thus, as a
result of Winship, defendants are still guaranteed the protection
66. 166 U.S. 432 (1895). See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
67. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. Id. at 364.
69. Id. at 363.
70. 397 U.S. at 363. The Court emphasized this point recently in Addington v. Texas,
99 S. Ct. 1804, 1810 (1979), when it held that the proper standard of proof at a civil
commitment hearing was greater than a preponderance; the reasonable doubt standard
was held not constitutionally required. Id. at 1812.
71. 397 U.S. at 364.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 363.
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afforded by this function of the presumption of innocence-an
explanation of the allocation of the burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard.
The Court in Whorton, however, ignored what traditionally
has been the other important function of the presumption-that
of an additional caution specifically directed to the jury to put
aside all suspicions and consider the evidence only.
In practical terms, the presumption of innocence serves as a
counterweight that is intended to nullify the tendency of jurors
to assume that the defendant is guilty .... Since the presumption of innocence is one facet of the law that is familiar to
laymen, it is probable that a jury will listen more closely to an
instruction on this subject than to one on some complex substantive rule of law.74
As indicated in the historical discussion, 5 even those commentators who believed that the presumption was merely a synonym for
the burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard stated
that because of its importance to the jury, it should not be abandoned. The Court itself recognized this function in Taylor:
"While the legal scholar may understand that the presumption
of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof are logically
similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw significant additional
'76
guidance from an instruction on the presumption of innocence.
Nevertheless, in Whorton, the Court refused to mandate its use
whenever requested. The lack of a constitutional mandate in this
area can only result in a critical loss of protection to criminal
defendants.
IV.

COMPELLING A DEFENDANT TO WEAR

PRISON CLOTHES AT TRIAL
In Estelle v. Williams, 77 the Court held that a defendant
cannot be compelled to wear prison clothes to his trial78 because
the practice impairs the presumption of innocence 9 undermines
the fairness of the factfinding process, and dilutes the principle
that guilt must be established by the evidence presented at trial.
74. 24

VAND.

L. REv. 412, 416-17 (1971).

75. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
76. 436 U.S. at 484.
77. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
78. Id. at 504.
79. Id.
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The Court said that the presumption of innocence is a basic component of a fair trial,80 even though it is not expressly stated in
the Constitution." The application of the doctrine in this context
reinforces its connection with the burden of proof. A prosecutor
must carry that burden with the evidence produced at trial and
cannot be aided by a courtroom practice that prejudices the jury
against the defendant.
Despite this finding that the practice did violate defendant's
due process right to a fair trial, the Court refused to adopt a per
se violation rule.8 2 It focused instead on the necessity of proving
that defendant was compelled by the state to wear prison
clothing. 3 The reason given for this focus on compulsion was that
wearing prison clothes was considered by the Court to be a common defense tactic used to elicit sympathy from the jury,8" even
though, as the dissent pointed out, no empirical data to support
that position exists, and even though the Court was able to cite
only one case in which it was proved that defendant wore his
prison clothes for tactical purposes."
Obviously, if defendant waived his right to appear in ordinary attire, no state compulsion existed. For this situation, the
Court, refusing to use the standard of a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver established in Johnson v. Zerbst8 for waiver of
the right to counsel, created a new standard to determine waiver.
The Court found that because defense counsel failed to object at
trial, defendant had waived his right to- be tried in civilian
clothes. 7 With this finding, the Court promulgated "the novel
80. Id. at 503.
81. Id. In Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972), the Court had said that
the presumption of innocence was "constitutionally rooted."
82. 425 U.S. at 512. For a history of the cases in this area, see Comment, Estelle v.
Williams and the Waiver of Due Process Trial Protections, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1252,
1253-57 (1977).
83. 425 U.S. at 507-08.
84. Id. at 508.
85. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
87. 425 U.S. at 512. The Court has permitted counsel to bind the defendant in other
situations, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In Henry, counsel had failed
to make a timely objection to the admission of illegally seized evidence. The Court remanded to determine whether counsel had deliberately failed to object in order to bypass
state court remedies. If counsel's failure to object had been deliberate, it would have
constituted a waiver binding on the defendant in federal court and precluding a decision
on the merits of his federal claim. 379 U.S. at 451. In Estelle, although evidence in the
record indicated that counsel's failure to object was not a defense tactic (e.g., defendant
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and dangerous doctrine that a basic due process safeguard, affecting the fairness and accuracy of the factfinding procedure, is a
contingent right that does not even come into existence until it
is affirmatively asserted." '
Counsel's objection properly has little bearing on the issue.
The prejudicial effect on the defendant occurs as soon as the
jurors see the defendant in his prison clothes. Even when counsel
objects and his objection is sustained, the objection cannot erase
the impact on the jurors of seeing the defendant, presumptively
innocent, already in prison clothes. Although the defendant may
have been detained solely because he could not afford bail, the
jurors may assume that he was detained because he was dangerous or because he had a prior record. 9 Certainly they would be
less likely to consider the defendant as a peer or equal after seeing
him in prison clothes. Other dangers that might affect the accuracy of the factfinding process also exist. The defendant might
choose not to testify on his own behalf, because he fears that the
jurors would be less likely to believe his testimony, or simply
because he does not wish to be paraded before the jurors while
he is dressed in prison clothing. 0 These possibly deleterious results affect both the defendant ivhose counsel does not object as
well as the defendant whose counsel does object. The vindication
of the defendant's right should not rest on that criterion. Nevertheless, the Court clearly decided that because counsel's failure
to object at trial negated any inference of compulsion by the
state, defendant's rights were sufficiently protected.'
The Court justified this diluted standard for waiver by stating that the right was not the kind of fundamental right involved
2 Justice
in Johnson v. Zerbst.1
Powell, in his concurring opinion,
reinforced the idea that this right was less fundamental and designated it a "trial-type right" without ever defining the term.93
Distinguishing a "trial-type right" from other constitutional
had asked for his clothes prior to trial, and counsel admitted that the only reason he did
not make the motion was that he thought it would be futile), the Court assumed that it
was a tactical maneuver and bound the defendant to a waiver without a hearing. 425 U.S.
at 512-13.
88. 425 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 512-13.
92. Id. at 508 n.3.
93. Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

11

368

SouthSOUTH
CarolinaCAROLINA
Law Review,
Vol. REvIEw
31, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 6
LAW

[Vol. 31

rights is a dangerous practice. What rights are more "trial-type"
than the right to counsel or the right to a jury trial?94 Previously,
the Court had "applied the Johnson criteria to assess the effectiveness of a waiver of other trial rights such as the right to confrontation, to a jury trial, and to a speedy trial, and the right to
be free from twice being placed in jeopardy."95 Was the Court in
Williams signalling the demise of the application of the Johnson
waiver standard to "trial-type" rights, or was it simply refusing
to extend application of that standard to the presumption-ofinnocence component of a fair trial? Either result would provide
less protection for criminal defendants. The Johnson waiver standard is necessary to protect defendants from losing vital constitutional rights inadvertently. Violation of a defendant's presumption of innocence cannot be distinguished reasonably from other
violations of the right to a fair trial. Yet the Court simply stated
that this right was not as fundamental as others,9" but gave no
supporting explanation. Consequently, even though the Court
stated that the presumption of innocence was a basic component
of a fair trial, the standard used to find a waiver of that right
weakened the defendant's ability to seek effective redress of the
violation..
V.

THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF TRIAL

o

The third context in which the application of the presumption of innocence has been challenged is its use outside the courtroom. Generally, it had been thought that the presumption of
innocence applied to the treatment of the accused from the time
of his arrest. The presumption of innocence traditionally meant
that
until there has been an adjudication of guilt by an authority
legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is
to be treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with
94. Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (footnotes deleted) (emphasis added). It is ironic that in this area a "trial-type" right is said to be a less fundamental
constitutional right while Supreme Court opinions concerning other "trial-type" rights
have been given retroactive effect because those rights were considered so important to
the accuracy of the factfinding process. Id. at 242.
96. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3.
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the probable outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open
question ...

The presumption of innocence is really a direction to the
authorities to ignore the presumption of guilt [the likely outcome] in their treatment of the suspect."
In several cases, the Supreme Court supported the application of
the presumption of innocence to the treatment of an arrestee.
In a 1951 decision, Stack v. Boyle," the Supreme Court expressly recognized the application of the presumption of innocence beyond the bounds of trial. In Boyle, the petitioners moved
to reduce bail," claiming that it was excessive in violation of the
eighth amendment.' °° Petitioners submitted statements concerning their prior criminal records, family relationships, and financial resources. The only proof offered by the government was a
showing that four persons previously charged under the same
federal statute had forfeited bond; no evidence, however, was
presented connecting those four people to petitioners. ' The
Court found that bail had not been fixed properly and remanded
the case 10 2 because the lower court had not taken into consideration the bail amount necessary to provide for the appearance of
these individual petitioners.0 3 "Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." ' 4 This statement indicated that the presumption of innocence was significant
from the time of arrest and that it was important to the overall
treatment of the accused. At the time Boyle was decided, the
Court evidently believed that the presumption of innocence encompassed more than merely the allocation of burden of proof
and the reasonable doubt standard at trial.
Another Supreme Court case, McGinnis v. Royster,"5 made
reference to the presumption of innocence as it applied to a
97. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 12 (1964).
98. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
99. Id. at 3.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
101. 342 U.S. at 3.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 4. Application of the presumption of innocence at pretrial stages can be
traced to the Rhode Island Constitution of 1842 which stated that since every man is
presumed innocent, "no act of severity which is not necessary to secure an accused person
shall be permitted." Thaler, supranote 19, at 460 (quoting R.I. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1842)).
105. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
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pretrial detainee. In McGinnis petitioners challenged on equal
protection grounds a New York statute"6 that had the effect of
incarcerating those defendants detained in jail before trial for a
longer period of time than those defendants released on bail pending trial. The statute prohibited the granting of "good time" to a
pretrial detainee, who is kept in county jail; it allowed "good
time" to be computed only after a defendant has been convicted
and imprisoned in the state penitentiary. Good time, awarded for
good behavior and efficient performance of one's duties during
incarceration, could reduce a prisoner's sentence by up to ten
days for every month served in prison." 7 Under the New York
statute, although the length of a pretrial detainee's sentence is
reduced both by the amount of time spent in pretrial incarceration and by any credit for good time earned after being transferred to the state penitentiary, a pretrial detainee could spend
more time in incarceration than a bailed defendant serving the
same sentence. This resulted because the pretrial detainee could
not earn any good time credit during the months of his pretrial
incarceration.
The Court found that the classification served a legitimate
state purpose in that "good time" takes into consideration a prisoner's rehabilitative performance, which is an important part of
the time spent at a state prison where a defendant, who had been
on bail prior to conviction, would spend his entire sentence." 8 On
the other hand, a county jail, where the pretrial detainee spends
his pre-sentence incarceration, serves only as a detention center,
with no rehabilitative programs, although the time spent there
does count toward satisfactory completion of the sentence. Thus,
no evaluation can be made of the prisoner's efficient and cooperative conduct, which, if favorable, might bring about an earlier
release.0 9 In its discussion of pretrial detention, the Court pointed
out that it would not be appropriate for the state to undertake in
the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a pretrial
detainee who is still clothed with the presumption of innocence."
Thus, the Court necessarily implied that the pretrial detainee
was protected by the presumption of innocence and was not to be
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

N.Y. ConnaC. LAW § 230(3) (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1970).
410 U.S. at 266-67.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
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treated in a way that would contradict the presumption."'
In Bell v. Wolfish, however, the Court ignored this statement
in McGinnis and invalidated the application of the doctrine outside the courtroom. The Court stated that the presumption of
innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials and may serve as part of a jury instruction, but that it
has "no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial
detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.""'
Wolfish involved the right of pretrial detainees to challenge
the conditions of their confinement. The detainees protested the
following conditions: double-bunks in cells designed for single
occupancy; a rule that denied detainees the right to receive books
and magazines from sources other than the publisher; a rule that
denied detainees the right to receive packages except one at
Christmas; unannounced searches of the cells during which the
inmates were prohibited from the area; and body cavity searches
conducted after every contact visit with an outsider. The Court
found that the due process clause and not the eighth amendment
provided the basis upon which to examine the challenged conditions.13 The eighth amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, is applicable only after the defendant has been
convicted in accordance with due process of law; at that point the
state acquires the power to punish so long as the punishment is
not "cruel and unusual.""' The due process clause, however, provides protection for the pretrial detainee."'
The Court found that the presumption of innocence was not
the source of a substantive right that required the use of a
compelling-necessity standard to determine whether the challenged conditions satisfied due process;"' many lower courts had
found that it did." 7 The Supreme Court said that the detainee's
111. See Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. 99 S. Ct. at 1871.
113. Id. at 1871-72 & n.16. Accord, Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1978);
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976); Duran v. Elrod,
542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Dillard v.
Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affl'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
114. 99 S. Ct. at 1871-72 & n.16.
115. Id. at 1872 & n.17.
116. Id. at 1870.
117. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d
998 (7th Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975); Detainees of Brooklyn
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right to be free from punishment " ' was at issue, and that this
right did not warrant a compelling-necessity standard"' because
it did not rise to the level of those fundamental rights involved
in cases that had required that standard. 10
The Court's initial inquiry was whether the challenged condition amounted to punishment.' Absent a showing of expressed
intent to punish on the part of the prison officials, the determination turned on whether the condition was rationally justified by
the purpose proposed and whether the condition appeared excessive in relation to the purpose. 22 The Court recognized two legitimate government interests for these challenged prison conditions.
The first was that recognized by most lower courts, namely, to
ensure the accused's presence at trial.11 The other legitimate interest was the need to manage the institution in which a detainee
is incarcerated.' In this area, the Court accorded "virtually unlimited deference to detention officials' justifications for particular impositions."1 2 The Court consistently had been reluctant to
involve the judiciary in the area of prison administration,12 but
its deference in Wolfish was excessive; the Court mentioned de-

House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d
333 (2d Cir. 1974). Contra, Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978); Hampton v.
Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976).
In Campbell v. McGruder, the court discussed important reasons why the presumption of innocence required a standard of compelling necessity and why it should continue
to protect defendants held in pretrial detention. First, the court mentioned the possibility
of mistake in the arrest. Second, the court stated that if the presumption of innocence
was to be respected by judge and jury in the courtroom it must be treated as an "article
of faith" by all of society outside the courtroom. 580 F.2d at 529 n.14.
118. 99 S.Ct. at 1871.
119. Id.
120. The Court listed the following cases which involved fundamental rights requiring the compelling.necessity standard: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 99 S.Ct. at 1871.
121. 99 S.Ct. at 1872.
122. Id. at 1873-74.
123. Id. at 1874. The following cases recognized that assuring presence at trial is the
sole legitimate purpose of pretrial detention: Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1978);
Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976);
Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D.
Ark. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affl'd, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972).
124. 99 S. Ct. at 1874.
125. Id. at 1886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
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administration officials twelve times
ferring to the judgment of
1 27
throughout the opinion.
The Court also ignored the use of the doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative, which maintains that when government
action impinges upon the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights or liberties, government must choose the least restrictive
alternative.1 2 The rule that prisoners could receive books only
from publishers infringed upon the prisoners' first amendment
rights. The prison administrators justified the ban on the basis
of security and the burden that would be placed on administration if they had to check for contraband in every book each inmate received. The administrators, however, could have chosen
a less restrictive means of accomplishing their purpose. For example, they could have limited the number of books that a prisoner
could receive each month, and/or used electronic devices to detect
contraband in the bindings.' 29 The administrators' rule was one
rational response, "[b]ut our precedents . . . require some con0 Similarly,
sideration of less restrictive alternatives.""1
the other
challenged practices could have been administered in a way that
satisfied prison security requirements but imposed a lesser burden on the prisoners' rights. The Court said, however, that
"[g]overnmental action does not have to be the only alternative
or even the best alternative for it to be reasonable, to say nothing
1 3
of constitutional. 1 '
After Wolfish it is hard to imagine conditions that could be
found to constitute a violation of a detainee's due process
rights. 32 The weakness of the standard is most evident in the
127. 99 S. Ct. at 1889 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

129. See 99 S. Ct. at 1892 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. Id.

131. Id. at 1876 n.25. The Court cited two cases in support, Vance v. Bradley, 99 S.
Ct. 939 (1979), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The Court stated in both

cases only that the classifications drawn did not have to be mathematically perfect to
meet a constitutional challenge. 99 S. Ct. at 949; 397 U.S. at 485.
132. In a recent federal district court case in New Jersey, Valentine v. Englehardt,
474 F. Supp. 294 (D.N.J. 1979), the court did find a constitutional violation in the rule
that children could not visit the inmates at the Passaic County Jail. The circumstances
of the case, however, indicate a rare opportunity to apply the Wolfish standard and still
be able to find the practice unconstitutional. The sheriff openly admitted that the rule
was necessary in the best interests of the children rather than because of security reasons.
Applying Wolfish, the court said that the issue was whether the rule constituted punishment. Absent an intent to punish expressed by the administrative officials, the determina-
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Court's justification for security reasons of body cavity searches
after contact visits,'33 even though the inmates were required to
wear one-piece jumpsuits that zipped down the front and the
visits took place in a continuously monitored glass enclosed
room.' 3 Moreover, the prison officials had proof of only one instance in which contraband had been found during a body cavity
search.'33 In effect, pretrial detainees, despite their presumed
innocence, can be subjected to the same conditions as convicted
inmates. The government conceded that " 'restrictions on the
possession of personal property'. . . 'serve the legitimate purpose

of punishment' with respect to convicted inmates as well as the
security purposes relied on in the present context of pretrial detainees."'' 6 This result is inconsistent with this country's traditional view of the presumption of innocence. A citizen is arrested
on the basis of probable cause, a standard much lower than the

proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessary for conviction. Nevertheless, Wolfish subjects that same citizen, often for no reason

other than his inability to post bond for bail, to be treated as if
he were convicted and sentenced.

'

He is subjected to the very

tion turned on whether a legitimate government interest was involved. The court found
no legitimate goal in the jailer's personal judgment that it was in the best interests of the
children to prohibit them from the jail. Had defendants in this case justified the rule on
the basis of jail security, the court would probably have deferred to their judgment on the
basis of Wolfish.
133. 99 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
134. Id. at 1894 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1884. The Court observed, however, that this "may be more a testament
to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on
the part of the inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises."
Id. at 1894-95 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 1901 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish
v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting Respondents' Post-Trial Memorandum at 212 n.**)).
137. It would be well to compare in this area the criminal system of the civil-law
countries. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights recognized the presumption
of innocence; however, the civil-law countries put their belief in the presumption into
practice in a manner substantially more meaningful than in the United States. Pretrial
detention, despite the likelihood of guilt, is always an exceptional measure in civil-law
countries. Summonses are used rather than arrest warrants whenever possible. To arrest
a suspect, it must be shown to the court that guilt is highly probable, the offense is major,
the danger of flight is present, and/or a threat of evidence tampering exists. Bail statutes
are on the books, but they rarely are used. If the criteria are met, the suspect is arrested
and detained. The governments seldom release a suspect once the criteria are established.
G. MUELLER & F. LE PoOLE-GRIFFrrHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 14-23, 93-94
(1960); Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure:A Plea for Utilizing Foreign
Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361, 370 (1977).
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same conditions that are applied to convicts as punishment, even
though the Court has stated that pretrial detainees may not be
punished. Thus, Wolfish leaves the pretrial detainee with little
means to challenge his jail conditions in the federal courts. 3 '
VI.

CONCLUSION

The importance and scope of the presumption of innocence
in the criminal justice system have been greatly diminished in the
federal system. The Court has restricted the principle's application solely to the trial stage in limited, yet undefined, circumstances that depend on the facts of each particular case and the discretion of each particular judge. Relief from this diminished individual protection may still be available, however, for defendants
in the state criminal system. State courts may use their own
constitutions to more fully protect pretrial detainees and criminal
defendants. Justice Stewart suggested in Kentucky v. Whorton
that the Kentucky court on remand consider the question of
harmless error as a matter of state law concerning the requirement of giving the requested instruction on the presumption of
innocence. 39 State courts may also be persuaded to find that the
presumption of innocence, a necessary element of due process,
requires the use of the compelling-necessity standard when deciding the rights of pretrial detainees during their confinement.
As Justice Brennan wrote,
state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize
constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are
138. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), makes the plight of the pretrial
detainee seem even bleaker. The Court held that (1) neither the first amendment nor the
fourteenth amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources
of government information within governmental control, and (2) the news media has no
constitutional right of access to a county jail over and above that of other persons. The
case arose when a broadcasting company was denied access to a county jail after the
suicide of an inmate. This denial was upheld by the Supreme Court. In a strong dissent,
Justice Stevens stated that the official prison policy of concealing knowledge from the
public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information is a violation of freedoms of speech
and of the press. Justice Stevens pointed out that some of the inmates were pretrial
detainees, unconvicted and entitled to the presumption of innocence. He said society had
a special interest in ensuring these citizens treatment in accord with their status. Id. at
37-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). When this case is considered with Wolfish, it becomes
apparent that not only does the detainee have little hope of successfully challenging his
jail conditions in the federal courts, but also he has little reason to look to the press to
bring inhumane conditions to the attention of the public.
139. 99 S. Ct. 2091 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due
regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight
as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. I
suggest to the bar that, although in the past it might have been
safe for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state
courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to
raise the state constitutional questions."'
Justice Brennan's admonition may be even more important
today. The holdings of the primary cases discussed in this note
have deprived people of important individual rights; however,
these rights may still be restored in the state arena through expansive use of state constitutions.
Marsha L. W. Reingen
140. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HAV.
L. REv. 489, 502 (1977).
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